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2.  A law and economics approach to 
cost shifting, fee arrangements and 
legal expense insurance
Louis Visscher and Tom Schepens
1. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we will provide an overview of the economic literature 
regarding cost shifting, fee arrangements and legal expense insurance. In 
the economic analysis of law, legal rules are regarded as instruments which 
can provide actors with behavioural incentives. In essence, private law 
(torts, contracts, property, etc.) allocates the costs which arise out of dif-
ferent activities. Those costs may only be borne by the party causing them 
if the party initially suff ering from them brings suit. Problems in fi nancing 
civil litigation may eff ectively hinder such lawsuits, so that the behavioural 
incentives which the law intends to provide do not reach the party causing 
the harm.
For example, tort law is regarded as an instrument that induces people 
to take care. The prospect of being held liable after negligently having 
caused losses may induce a potential tortfeasor to take due care, because 
taking due care (thereby avoiding liability) is less costly than taking too 
little care (and being liable). Contract law is seen as a device that enables 
people to increase welfare by engaging in voluntary transactions. The 
remedies of contract law (specifi c performance and damages) induce the 
debtor to fulfi l his contractual duties when this is less costly than breach-
ing the contract and facing the sanction. If the victim of a tort or the credi-
tor in a contractual setting does not bring a claim against the tortfeasor 
or the debtor, neither the tortfeasor nor debtor would face any expected 
sanction. This would not confront them with the costs they have caused 
and hence they would not receive the desired incentives. After all, in decid-
ing how to behave, rational actors do not look at the costs they may cause, 
but only at the costs they may have to bear (Schäfer 2000, p. 184).
Many reasons exist that explain why actors such as the victim of a 
tort or the creditor in a contract may not eff ectuate their claim. The fi rst 
M2459 - TUIL PRINT.indd   7 23/09/2010   17:16
8 New trends in fi nancing civil litigation in Europe
reason, which forms the topic of this chapter, is that the costs of bringing a 
claim may outweigh the expected benefi ts. In such cases, a rational victim 
would decide not to eff ectuate the claim, because that would cost more 
than it yields in expected benefi ts. In economic terms, the victim stays 
rationally apathetic (This concept was introduced by Downs (1957). Also 
see Schäfer 2000, p. 184). Besides rational apathy, other reasons exist for 
why actors may not bring suit. They might not know that a law infringe-
ment has occurred to which they can react. In a typical tort setting, the 
victim often knows that he has been injured, and he knows the injurer or 
the costs of identifying the injurer are low (Landes and Posner 1975, p. 31). 
With infringements of safety regulations, for example, this may be diff er-
ent. It may be diffi  cult for individual victims to recognize unsafe products, 
and violations of safety standards might go undetected until harm occurs. 
Even after harm has materialized, it may prove to be diffi  cult for the 
individual victim to prove violation of the relevant safety rules (Van den 
Bergh and Visscher 2008, p. 40). The burden of proof constitutes another 
reason why victims do not always bring a claim. If they assess that they 
will not be able to prove negligence, causation, legally relevant losses, et 
cetera, they could very well decide not to start a procedure, given that they 
do not expect to prevail. Finally, strategic behaviour may bar claims from 
being brought. If the victim is not the only one who suff ered losses, he may 
try to take a free ride on the eff orts of other victims. If a group of people 
suff ers from, for example, noise or smell from a nearby factory, an action 
for an injunction would benefi t all victims. Each individual victim prefers 
someone else to bear the costs of the lawsuit, because after a successful 
procedure, he will also benefi t from the injunction. If too many victims 
behave as free riders, the necessary law suit may not be brought in the fi rst 
place, leaving all victims worse off .
We will focus our attention on the issue of rational apathy. We will 
analyze three possible ways to overcome this problem: cost shifting, fee 
arrangements and legal expense insurance. All of these approaches shift 
(some of) the costs of civil litigation to party other than the plaintiff . Cost 
shifting entails that (part of) the litigation costs of a successful plaintiff  are 
transferred to the defendant. Fee arrangement lead to the result that the 
plaintiff  only bears attorney costs if he wins. Legal expense insurance shifts 
the costs to the insurer, in exchange for a premium. By lowering the fi nan-
cial hurdles of bringing a claim, all instruments may provide solutions to 
the problem of fi nancing civil litigation, thereby improving the behav-
ioural incentives that the legal system can provide. This may ultimately 
even lead to fewer cases being tried because fewer violations occur (Miceli 
and Segerson 1991, Katz 2000, p. 76 ff .).
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the economic 
M2459 - TUIL PRINT.indd   8 23/09/2010   17:16
 A law and economics approach  9
literature dealing with these instruments. We believe this literature pro-
vides valuable insights which help to assess the potential of and the limits 
to these instruments to overcome or decrease the rational apathy problem. 
This is obviously very relevant for a volume which discusses new trends 
in fi nancing civil litigation from a legal, empirical and economic point of 
view.
We will analyze the possible impact of cost shifting, fee arrange-
ments and legal expense insurance not only on the number of suits being 
brought, but on all stages in the dispute resolution process: (1) fi ling a 
claim, (2) possibly dropping the claim due to new information, (3) set-
tlement negotiations and (4) adjudication. We investigate the impact of 
the various instruments by comparing them with the situation where the 
plaintiff  himself bears the costs. In Section 2 we briefl y describe the dispute 
resolution process and indicate the economic decision- making process in 
each stage. In Section 3 we analyze the impact of cost shifting, more spe-
cifi cally applying the so- called English Rule instead of the American Rule. 
In Section 4 we investigate the infl uence of fee arrangements by comparing 
a system of hourly fees with a system of contingency fees. In Section 5 we 
analyze the impact of legal expense insurances in each stage of the dispute 
resolution process. In Section 6 we summarize and conclude.
2. THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS
The economic theory of litigation was developed in the early 1970s’. It 
still serves as the standard model and also constitutes the basis of our 
approach (Landes 1971, Gould 1973, Posner 1973. Also see Cooter and 
Rubinfeld 1989, Kobayashi and Parker 2000, Shavell 2004, pp. 389- 418).
The economic theory of litigation does not only encompass the diff erent 
stages of dispute resolution, but also the stage before a dispute has even 
arisen. In other words, the phase in which actors decide how to behave is 
also included in the analysis. It is assumed that actors behave rationally. 
That is, they are assumed to maximize their expected utility, given their 
beliefs and their available information. Hence, the behaviour in the fi rst 
stage of the model depends on a weighing of expected costs and benefi ts. 
Expected liability is a relevant factor in this weighing process. By taking 
adequate care, by fulfi lling contractual obligations, et cetera, parties can 
reduce the probability of being held liable or they can avoid liability 
altogether. The level of expected liability and hence the expected utility 
of the potential wrongdoer is infl uenced by whether or not the potential 
victims respond to an infringement. If they remain rationally apathetic, 
the potential wrongdoer faces no expected liability. This provides him with 
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inadequate behavioural incentives, compared to the social optimum where 
he incorporates the eff ects of his behaviour on others.
At the second stage, the plaintiff , who in the fi rst stage suff ered losses 
due to the behaviour of the defendant, decides whether or not to fi le a 
claim. This stage is called the fi ling stage. It is important to note that the 
fi ling stage encompasses both formal and informal ways of bringing a 
claim. Shavell describes it as follows: ‘Bringing suit is interpreted as any 
action which results ultimately in settlement or in trial. Thus, we would 
consider a mere threat to initiate formal proceedings as a suit if the threat 
resulted in a settlement’ (Shavell 1982, 56 nt. 5). Given that fi ling a claim 
costs time and/or money, a plaintiff  will only do so if he has a credible 
threat to go to trial. Generally speaking, this is the case if the expected 
value of the claim (the expected judgment, multiplied by the probability of 
prevailing) exceeds the expected costs. Such cases are referred to as posi-
tive net expected value claims. In the absence of such a credible threat, the 
potential defendant does not fear trial and does not incorporate expected 
liability into his decisions. However, it is recognized in the literature that 
negative expected value suits may also be brought if they can induce the 
defendant to settle (Bebchuck 1996, Kobayashi and Parker 2000, p. 14). 
This could happen if, for example, the defendant’s costs of going to trial 
outweigh the costs of settlement, even if the defendant is certain to prevail 
in court. We will not incorporate this situation in our analysis.
After a plaintiff  has fi led a claim, new information which infl uences 
the expected outcome may become available. If a claim that previously 
seemed to have a positive net expected value, after incorporation of the 
new information turns out to have a negative expected value, the plaintiff  
may decide to drop it in the third stage of the dispute resolution process. 
For example, the plaintiff ’s losses may be lower than he originally assessed, 
so that the expected damages if successful also decrease. It is also possible 
that the new information becomes available at another stage of the whole 
procedure, for example after the defendant refuses to off er to settle (P’ng 
1983, p. 540, P’ng 1987, pp. 62–63. Also see Kobayashi and Parker 2000, 
p. 14). In this chapter, however, we only deal with a drop stage between 
fi ling the claim and engaging in settlement negotiations.
In phase four, settlement negotiations may take place. Due to the high 
costs, risks and duration of going to trial, parties may prefer to settle their 
dispute. If both parties would be better off  by settling, there exists a settle-
ment surplus, resulting in a positive settlement range. The plaintiff  would 
be better off  if the settlement exceeds the expected outcome of trial minus 
the expected litigation costs he has to bear. The defendant would be better 
off  if the settlement amount falls short of the expected judgment at trial 
plus the expected litigation costs he has to bear. The settlement surplus 
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equals the sum of both parties’ litigation costs minus the amount by which 
the plaintiff ’s estimation of the expected judgment exceeds the defend-
ant’s estimation (Cooter and Rubinfeld 1989, p. 1075). For example, if the 
plaintiff  assesses the outcome of trial at 100, the defendant at 80 and the 
litigation costs would amount to 25 for each party, the settlement surplus 
is (25 1 25 − 20) 5 30. The plaintiff  would be better off  if the settlement 
exceeds (100 − 25) 5 75, and the defendant if the settlement is less than 
(80 1 25) 5 105. The diff erence of 30 between both limits is the settlement 
surplus. The settlement range runs from 75 to 105. Whether or not a set-
tlement will actually be reached depends on the information both parties 
possess and on the bargaining process, where the possibility of strategic 
behaviour is important (P’ng 1983, Shavell 1982, Hay and Spier 1998, 
Daughety 2000). The chance that a settlement is reached, increases with 
the size of the settlement surplus.
If the parties do not reach a settlement, the case proceeds to the fi fth 
stage: trial. Each party will spend rationally on litigation up to the point 
where an additional investment no longer improves the expected outcome 
by more than the additional costs. The optimal expenditure for each party 
is found there, where its marginal costs equal its marginal benefi ts.
3. COST SHIFTING
3.1 Introduction
Diff erent arrangements regarding litigation costs exist. Under the so- 
called English Rule, the prevailing party recovers some or all litigation 
costs from the unsuccessful party. In contrast, under the American Rule, 
each party bears its own expenses. In order to be able to fully focus on 
the impact of cost shifting, in this section we compare the English Rule, 
where all costs are shifted, with the American Rule and disregard the more 
complicated intermediary possibilities where only some costs are shifted. 
The theoretical eff ects we distinguish in the analysis below will in practice 
be less pronounced if not all costs are shifted.
3.2 Trial Expenditure
In economic literature, it is argued that trial expenditure will be greater 
under the English Rule than under the American Rule (Brauetigam, Owen 
and Panzar 1984, pp. 180–181, Katz 1987, p. 159 ff ., Hause 1989, p. 166). 
After all, given that under the English Rule the unsuccessful party has to 
bear the litigation costs of the prevailing party (so that there is more at 
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stake), the marginal benefi ts of additional investment in trial expenditure 
outweigh those under the American Rule. It is optimal to invest until the 
marginal costs equal the marginal benefi ts, and due to the higher marginal 
benefi ts this point is reached later under the English Rule. In addition 
to the higher marginal benefi ts, the marginal costs are lower under the 
English Rule, because parties only expect to bear litigation costs if they 
lose the trial.
It is diffi  cult to isolate this eff ect empirically. Hughes and Snyder have 
studied the introduction of the English Rule to medical malpractice claims 
during the period 1980–85 in Florida. This research reports an increase 
in defence expenditure of 108 per cent for litigated claims and 150 per 
cent for settled claims (Hughes and Snyder 1998, p. 51). Kritzer, however, 
argues that it is hard to isolate the impact of fee arrangements. He states 
that ‘this does not mean that fee arrangements do not matter; rather, it is 
indicative of the complexity of the eff ects of fee arrangements. The various 
eff ects tend to cross- cut in signifi cant ways. The result is often that clear 
evidence of eff ects is diffi  cult to fi nd’ (Kritzer 2002, p. 1983).
3.3 Level of Suit
The likely eff ect of cost shifting on the level of suits depends on several 
interrelated factors. These eff ects are most clearly shown when compared 
to the benchmark where the cost- allocation rule does not matter: the 
plaintiff  assesses his probability of winning at 50 per cent; both parties are 
expected to spend the same amount on litigation; the English Rule does 
not lead to greater trial expenditures and both parties are risk neutral. By 
subsequently changing one of these four conditions, its eff ect on the level 
of suit can be assessed.
The fi rst issue is the plaintiff ’s assessment of his chance of prevailing. 
The higher his estimated probability of success, the higher the expected 
benefi ts of the suit. The expected value of the claim (net of litigation 
costs) therefore increases with the probability of success, which results 
in a higher willingness to sue (Shavell 1982, pp. 59–60. Also see Rickman 
1995, p. 331). This eff ect is stronger under the English Rule, because under 
the American Rule a successful plaintiff  still has to bear his own litigation 
costs.
The second relevant factor is how much both parties are spending on 
litigation. All other things being equal, if the plaintiff  expects to outspend 
the defendant, he is more likely to bring suit under the English Rule than 
under the American Rule. After all, given the estimated probability of 
success of 50 per cent, under the English Rule the plaintiff  expects to 
have to bear half of both parties’ costs, which by defi nition (due to the 
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outspending) is less than having to bear his own costs fully under the 
American Rule (Hause 1989, pp. 167–168, Snyder and Hughes 1990, 
p. 349). The opposite result holds if the plaintiff  expects to be outspended 
by the defendant.
The third factor relates to Section 3.2 above. There it became clear that 
parties are expected to spend more on litigation under the English Rule. 
This greater expenditure lowers the claim’s expected value, which results 
in a lower level of suit as compared to the American Rule (Hause 1989, 
pp. 167–168, Snyder and Hughes 1990, p. 351, 352).
Finally, the risk attitude of parties matters. A risk neutral actor is only 
concerned with the expected value of a certain project and not with the 
possible magnitude of the outcome. (S)he therefore is indiff erent between 
a project with a certain outcome of €100 and a project with a 50 per 
cent probability of €200. A risk- averse actor on the other hand is also 
concerned with the possible magnitude of the outcome and prefers the 
certainty of €100 over the 50 per cent possibility of €200. This risk attitude 
is caused by the decreasing marginal utility of wealth, due to which a loss 
in wealth leads to a more than proportional loss in utility. The plaintiff ’s 
risk aversion leads to a lower level of suit, given that litigation entails 
uncertainty. This eff ect is stronger under the English Rule than under the 
American Rule, because the consequences of winning or losing are larger 
(Shavell 1982, pp. 61–62). The greater expenditures eff ect of the English 
Rule reinforces this.
The four eff ects are interrelated and depend on the circumstances of the 
case. It is therefore not possible to determine a general overall eff ect on the 
level of suit of a shift from the American to the English Rule.
3.4 Quality of the Claims
The fi rst eff ect of a shift to the English Rule that we have described in 
Section 3.3 encourages the fi ling of high- merit claims. After all, the higher 
the probability of success, the lower the probability of having to bear the 
litigation costs under the English Rule, whereas under the American Rule 
the plaintiff  would still bear his own costs. This eff ect is very clear in the 
extreme situation of certainty of winning the case. Under the American 
Rule, the plaintiff  still has to bear his litigation costs, and hence refrains 
from fi ling the claim if its value is lower than these costs, even if he is 
certain to win. Under the English Rule he would fi le the claim, because he 
is certain that he does not bear the litigation costs himself (Shavell 1982, 
p. 59, Rosenberg and Shavell 1985, pp. 5–6). However, the second eff ect we 
have described in Section 3.3 (outspending) may mitigate the encourage-
ment of high- merit claims under the English Rule: in case the defendant 
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suffi  ciently outspends the plaintiff  low value claims are discouraged, even 
if they are of high merit. The third eff ect (greater expenditures) and intro-
duction of risk aversion may also hinder the encouragement of strong but 
small claims under the English Rule (Hause 1989, pp. 167–168, Snyder and 
Hughes 1990, p. 349 ff .).
Cost- shifting discourages the fi ling of weak claims, because the prob-
ability that the plaintiff  who fi les a weak claim also has to bear the 
litigation costs of the defendant is relatively high. The greater expendi-
tures eff ect, risk aversion and outspending by the plaintiff  reinforce this 
discouragement.
Hence, the English Rule entails a selection eff ect in favour of high merit 
claims, even of relatively low value. This eff ect is, however, mitigated 
by greater expenditures, increased risk and possible outspending by the 
defendant. Due to these mitigating eff ects, there is a critical probability of 
success and a critical value of the claim below which the plaintiff  will not 
sue. This leads to a selection eff ect in the direction of high merit and high 
value claims (Snyder and Hughes 1990, p. 349). Empirical research indeed 
suggests that the probability for plaintiff s to prevail increases under the 
English Rule (Hughes and Snyder 1995, p. 238).
It should be noted that if a plaintiff  is judgment proof so that he cannot 
pay the litigation costs of the defendant in the case of losing the trial, he 
may also fi le weaker claims (Di Pietro, Karns and Kelley 1995, p. 101). 
Furthermore, the plaintiff ’s subjective assessment of the merits of the 
claim determines his behaviour. Given that under the English Rule he may 
have to bear the litigation costs of both parties, he will have an incentive 
to screen claims more carefully (Mause 1969, p. 32).
3.5 Drop Rate
Whether a plaintiff  drops a claim depends on his assessment of the 
expected value of the claim. Given the quality enhancing features of the 
English Rule, which were discussed above, one would expect a lower drop 
rate than under the American Rule. Fewer low quality claims, which may 
eventually reach the drop stage, are brought under the English Rule in the 
fi rst place. However, whether or not a claim is dropped ultimately depends 
on the type of information that becomes available after the claim is 
brought and, more in particular, the way in which the information aff ects 
the claim’s expected value under either one or both rules. It is theoretically 
impossible to know what information will become available. Therefore, it 
is also impossible to predict the overall eff ect on the drop rate.
Despite the theoretical impossibility of predicting the overall eff ect, 
there is empirical research that found an increase in the drop rate of 10.4 
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per cent (Snyder and Hughes 1990, p. 364). This may be explained by 
the low fi ling costs: plaintiff s fi le a claim without carefully ascertaining 
its quality, with the purpose of acquiring more information (Snyder and 
Hughes 1990, p. 377). The claim selection characteristic of the English 
Rule apparently occurs at the drop stage rather than at the fi ling stage.
3.6 Settlement Rate
When the literature on the eff ects of the English Rule on settlement behav-
iour is analyzed, it becomes clear that no unambiguous results exist. Given 
that the English Rule increases litigation expenditure, it increases the set-
tlement surplus. Settlement hence becomes more attractive because it can 
avoid higher litigation costs (Bowles 1987, p. 177 ff ., Hause 1989, p. 167). 
Risk aversion strengthens this tendency, because by settling, parties can 
avoid the risky trial (Shavell 1982, p. 68).
On the other hand, in as far as parties have a tendency to overestimate 
their probability of success, the English Rule leads to fewer settlements. 
Over optimism reduces the settlement surplus because it increases the dif-
ference in the parties’ expectations of the outcome of the trial. The English 
Rule strengthens this eff ect because the over optimism also extends to the 
litigation costs (Shavell 1982, pp. 65–66, Katz (1987), p. 157 ff ).
The overall eff ect of cost shifting on the settlement rate cannot be 
determined theoretically, because it depends on the relative size of the two 
distinguished eff ects. Empirical research suggests that the over optimism 
eff ect dominates, for it has found a decrease in the settlement rate of 9.6 
per cent (Snyder and Hughes 1990, p. 366).
3.7 Level of Adjudication
All the above- described eff ects determine the overall infl uence of cost 
shifting on the level of adjudication. It is impossible to draw general con-
clusions on this issue on a theoretical level. Empirical research found that 
the probability for a fi led claim to be adjudicated decreased by 5 per cent 
as a result of the English Rule. This eff ect consists of a decrease of 9.4 per 
cent due to the selection eff ect, which leads to a higher drop rate on the 
one hand, and an increase of 4.4 per cent due to less settlements as a result 
of over optimism on the other hand (Snyder and Hughes 1990, p. 364 ff .).
3.8 Duration of Claims
The decision whether or not to drop a claim is made on the basis of its 
expected value. As soon as this value becomes negative, the claim will be 
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dropped. New information leading to a lower estimation of the merits 
of the claim under the English Rule also increases the assessed prob-
ability of having to bear the other party’s litigation costs. Hence, the 
expected value decreases more quickly under the English Rule as such 
information becomes available, leading to an earlier drop than under the 
American Rule. The greater expenditure eff ect strengthens this tendency 
(Hughes and Savoca 1997, p. 264). Empirical fi ndings corroborate this 
view (Hughes and Savoca 1997, p. 269).
The English Rule also shortens the duration of the settled claims. Due 
to the selection eff ect, the claims that proceed to the settlement stage are, 
on average, of higher quality. If parties indeed settle, the over optimism 
eff ect has turn out not to be prohibitively large. Under these conditions, 
the plaintiff  has a credible threat to go to trial, and given the relatively high 
quality of the case, the defendant faces a good possibility of having to bear 
all litigation costs. It is therefore in his best interest to quickly settle the 
case (Hughes and Savoca 1997, pp. 264–265, 269).
The adjudication phase, fi nally, is expected to take longer under the 
English Rule, due to the greater expenditures eff ect. The possibility of 
having to pay the other party’s litigation costs does not counter this eff ect, 
because parties are overly optimistic about their prospects (otherwise, 
they would have already dropped or settled the claim). Each party hence 
expects that the other party will have to bear the litigation costs (Hughes 
and Savoca 1997, p. 294).
4. FEE ARRANGEMENTS
4.1 Introduction
Lawyer’s fees constitute a large part of the costs of pursuing a legal claim 
(see for example Williams and Williams 1994, p. 79 ff .). Broadly speaking, 
besides fi xed fees, two forms of payment for legal services exist: hourly fees 
and contingency fees. Under hourly fees, the party hiring the attorney has 
to pay the fee, regardless of the outcome of the case. Under contingency 
fees, on the other hand, the lawyer’s reward often depends on two contin-
gencies. First, if the case is lost, the lawyer receives no compensation (‘no 
cure, no pay’). Second, if the case is won, the fee is often a prefi xed percent-
age of the obtained award (‘quota pars litis’).
In many European countries, contingency fees are prohibited, whereas 
in the United States these are commonly used (also see Chapter 3 by Faure, 
Fernhout and Philipsen and Chapter 8 by Hensler). Article 3.3 of the Code 
of Conduct for Lawyers in the European Union explicitly states that ‘A 
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lawyer shall not be entitled to make a pactum de quota litis’. However, 
the traditional European resistance seems to be weakening. In the United 
Kingdom, conditional fees were adopted in the 1990s. The main diff er-
ence between contingent and conditional fees is the idea of quota pars litis, 
which is not present under conditional fees. Under such conditional fees 
the lawyer receives a premium (not related to the amount at stake) if the 
case is won and nothing if the case is lost. According to Emons, in Belgium 
and the Netherlands such conditional fees also exist. Furthermore, ‘Spain, 
France, Italy, and Portugal are considering the introduction of condi-
tional fees. Germany has also relaxed some restrictions by means of third 
party contingent contracts (. . .). In Greece contingent fees of up to 20 per 
cent as well as conditional fees are permitted’ (Emons 2007, pp. 89–90. 
See Faure, Hartlief and Philipsen 2006a and 2006b and Chapter 3 in this 
book for an overview of conditional fees in several European countries 
and Hong Kong).
In this section, we will analyse hourly fees and contingency fees from an 
economic point of view. Both the dispute resolution model as well as the 
principal–agent theory is relevant in this respect. Both will be subsequently 
discussed.
4.2 Level of Suit
In the literature it is generally argued that contingency fees lead to an 
increase in the level of suit. The fi rst reason, which lies at the core of this 
chapter and even the entire book, is the fact that contingency fees can be 
used to fi nance the attorney costs of pursuing a claim. After all, the costs 
are only paid after a positive result has been achieved. In essence, the 
plaintiff  borrows money from his lawyer while the case is pending. This 
allows him to bring suit also in cases where an hourly wage might have 
been prohibitively costly.
Second, contingency fees essentially contain an insurance policy which 
shifts the risk of not obtaining a suffi  cient award to cover the attorney 
costs from the plaintiff  to the lawyer. Risk- averse plaintiff s will hence 
be less often deterred from bringing a claim, because their fi nancial risk 
is lower under contingency fees (Posner [1973] 2003, p. 584). Given that 
lawyers can diversify their portfolio of cases, they are likely to be less risk 
averse than their clients. This reduces the overall costs of risk borne by the 
plaintiff s and lawyers. Hourly fees do not allow for such benefi cial risk 
sharing (Gravelle 1998, p. 383).
Whether or not these two eff ects lead to an overall increase in the level 
of suit depends on the existence of overcapacity in the market for legal 
services. If there is no excess capacity and lawyers in some cases shift 
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from hourly wages to contingency fees, the total number of cases would 
decrease if they spend more time on these contingency fee cases than they 
would have spent under a system of hourly fees. There is (limited) empiri-
cal literature suggesting that contingency fee lawyers spend fewer hours on 
small cases than hourly fee lawyers, but more hours on cases with a higher 
value (Kritzer et al. 1985, pp. 266–267).
The percentage that is agreed upon in the contingency fee arrangement 
determines the share of the judgment that the plaintiff  receives after deduc-
tion of the lawyer’s fee. In his decision of whether or not to bring suit, the 
plaintiff  compares his expected benefi ts with the other costs involved in lit-
igation, which he still bears himself. After all, contingency fees only regard 
the attorney fee. The agreed percentage itself therefore also infl uences the 
level of suit. On the one hand, the higher this percentage the less often a 
plaintiff  will bring suit because the expected benefi ts decrease. On the other 
hand, in as far as a higher percentage induces the attorney to devote more 
eff ort to the case (see Section 4.5 below), the probability of winning and/
or the magnitude of the award may increase, leading to higher expected 
benefi ts. The overall eff ect cannot be predicted theoretically.
4.3 Quality of the Claims
It is often argued that contingency fees encourage meritless litigation, 
because the plaintiff  does not bear the risk of having to pay the attorney 
fee if he loses. Hence, under the simplifying assumption that there are no 
litigation costs besides the attorney fee (which better allows us to focus 
on the diff erence between hourly fees and contingency fees), the plaintiff  
would be willing to start a claim as soon as there is a positive probability 
of success, no matter how small.
However, this line of reasoning overlooks the crucial role of the attor-
ney. He will only be interested in trying the case if there is a large enough 
probability of winning, because only then will he receive the agreed per-
centage (Dana and Spier 1993, pp. 349–350, Miceli 1994). Given that a 
lawyer is a repeat player who ordinarily can better assess the quality of 
a case than the plaintiff , he will also be better able to screen cases and 
distinguish the low- quality from the high- quality cases. In that sense, con-
tingency fees are expected to increase the overall quality of the cases being 
brought (Clermont and Currivan 1978, pp. 571–572). Empirical research 
verifi es this gate- keeping role of lawyers working on a contingency fee 
basis, but it also shows that lawyers turn down cases with a relative low 
value (Kritzer 1997, p. 26 ff .). A report on the profi tability of conditional 
fees in the United Kingdom suggests that specialization as well as screen-
ing cases on their probability of success has a positive impact on the profi ts 
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of a fi rm (KPMG 1998). Other research indicates that under a system of 
hourly fees lawyers have fewer incentives to provide the plaintiff  with an 
unbiased assessment of the quality of their claim than contingency fee 
lawyers (Dana and Spier 1993).
4.4 Drop Rate
Given that the remuneration of a contingency fee lawyer depends 
on the outcome of the case, we can expect him to screen information 
that becomes available after the suit was brought more carefully than 
hourly fee lawyers. In deciding whether or not to continue the case, 
the contingency fee lawyer requires a suffi  ciently high expected return. 
This so- called screening eff ect leads to more cases being dropped under 
 contingency fees.
However, there is an opposite selection eff ect, which is caused by less 
screening by hourly fee lawyers in the fi ling stage, which was discussed in 
Section 4.3. Hourly fee lawyers have fewer incentives to avoid low quality 
claims from being fi led so more of such claims reach the drop stage. The 
probability that clients will decide to drop a claim as a result of new infor-
mation suggesting a negative expected value is therefore higher under 
hourly fees than under contingency fees.
Theoretically it is impossible to predict the overall eff ect of contingency 
fees on the drop rate. Danzon and Lillard (1983, p. 363) in their empiri-
cal research found that the selection eff ect outweighs the screening eff ect. 
Limitations on contingency fees lead to an increase in the drop rate of 5 
per cent.
4.5 Settlement Rate
Diff erent strands of literature provide diff erent predictions regarding the 
impact of contingency fees on the settlement rate. In the fi rst strand it is 
argued that contingency fees lead to more settlements, because this way the 
lawyer secures his share of the settlement without having to invest addi-
tional time and eff ort. Given that the lawyer is interested in his share of the 
settlement rather than in the client’s share, he may advise to settle for an 
amount that is too low, as this increases the likelihood that the defendant 
accepts the settlement off er (see for example Schwartz and Mitchell 1970, 
Miller 1987, Thomason 1991 and Gravelle and Waterson 1993).
The second strand of literature incorporates the eff ect of fee arrange-
ments on attorney eff ort. Contingency fee lawyers in essence weigh their 
costs of additional eff orts against the expected increase in their own 
reward, which is only a fraction of the total benefi ts of increased eff orts. 
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This induces them to spend less time on a tried case than is in the best inter-
est of their client. Only if the contingency fee percentage is 100 per cent 
(hence, if the lawyer buys the claim from his client), would this problem 
be avoided. This, however, is prohibited in most US states (Santore and 
Viard 2001). Incorporating this eff ect on attorney eff ort, the expected cost 
of the defendant of going to trial is lower, making it less likely for him to 
accept any given settlement demand. The costs of the plaintiff ’s attorney 
of going to court are also lower because he spends less than optimal eff orts 
on it. This can result in the contingency fee lawyer proposing a settlement 
off er that is too high, resulting in fewer settlements, so that the case goes 
to trial (Polinsky and Rubinfeld 2002, p. 222 ff . Also see Miceli 1994, 
Bebchuk and Guzman 1996 and Rickman 1999).
Empirical evidence corroborates the fi ndings of the second strand of 
literature. The settlement rate turns out to increase if limits on contingency 
fees are introduced, and the settlement amounts decrease (Danzon and 
Lillard 1983, p. 363, Snyder and Hughes 1990, p. 366).
4.6 Level of Adjudication
In the previous sections, we have seen that under hourly fees the drop 
rate of claims as well as the number of settled cases is higher than under 
contingency fees. Hence, relatively fewer claims are adjudicated under 
hourly fees. It is also shown empirically that limitations on contingency 
fees tend to decrease the probability that a claim proceeds to trial (Snyder 
and Hughes 1990, p. 360).
4.7 Duration of Claims
When discussing the drop rate, we saw that under contingency fees the 
lawyer is the primary decision taker, whereas under hourly fees it is the 
client. Both want to avoid spending resources on a case with an expected 
value that is too low. Given the superior information of the lawyer in this 
respect, we expect fi led cases to be dropped sooner under contingency fees. 
We do not know of any empirical studies regarding this specifi c issue.
Regarding the settlement phase, a contingency fee lawyer does not gain 
by prolonging the negotiations any further than necessary, because he 
does not gain by this. Hourly fee lawyers, however, can increase billable 
hours by dilatory tactics. Settlements are therefore expected to take longer 
under hourly fees. This also shows empirically (Helland and Tabarrok 
2003, p. 536 ff .).
With the same line of reasoning, we expect adjudication to take longer 
under hourly fees than under contingency fees.
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4.8 Attorney Costs
Contingency fee lawyers will charge a premium for the de facto fi nanc-
ing and insurance services they provide, so that the expected hourly 
wages of contingency fee lawyers will exceed those of hourly fee lawyers 
(Brickman 1996, p. 270). This eff ect may be mitigated because contingency 
fee lawyers can use the contingent fee in the competition process, in order 
to attract more clients. However, it is an empirical question if the market 
for lawyers’ services is competitive enough for this downward tendency. 
Another possible reason for a decrease in contingency fees is the fact that 
high- quality lawyers with a relative large success rate are able to ask for 
a lower percentage than lower quality lawyers. By charging a relative 
low fee, high quality lawyers can signal their quality, thereby attracting 
more clients. The danger, however, exists that clients view the low fee as a 
signal of low rather than high quality, in which case the signal would not 
be able to separate high quality and low quality lawyers (Brickman 2003, 
pp. 100–101).
4. 9 Principal–Agent Issues
Implicit in the above analysis, we have already encountered a number of 
issues regarding the principal–agent relationship of clients and lawyers. 
The common ground of these issues is that the interests of lawyers and 
clients are not necessarily well- aligned. The client has an interest in 
winning the case against as low costs as possible, whereas the lawyer has 
an interest in earning an as high as possible fee.
This tension appeared in Section 4.3, where we argued that hourly fee 
lawyers have fewer incentives to provide the plaintiff  with an unbiased 
assessment of the quality of their claim than contingency fee lawyers. 
Given the tendency of clients to choose contingency fees whenever there 
is a possibility of losing the case, a contingency fee lawyer may advise his 
client to take the case on a contingency fee basis, where in fact an hourly 
fee would have been better for the client (Kritzer 1998, p. 305). Also, given 
the fact that the lawyer can better assess the risks, he may negotiate a per-
centage that is higher than the case justifi es (Halpern and Turnbull 1983, 
p. 14). Both possibilities for opportunistic behaviour are curtailed some-
what in rules governing fee negotiations in the United States and in the 
possibility of having the reasonableness of the fees evaluated by the court.
In Section 4.7 we discussed the eff ects on the duration of the case. The 
client often does not have adequate information to evaluate the amount 
of time an hourly fee lawyer claims is required for the case. This may 
induce the lawyer to allocate too many hours to the case. In Section 4.5 
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we already saw that the opposite is true for a contingency fee lawyer, who 
is not expected to spend enough time on the case, given that he bears the 
full costs of additional eff ort, but only receives a fraction of the benefi ts 
thereof. An additional problem with hourly fee lawyers is that they could 
bill for more hours than they have actually put in. Contingency fees may 
reduce this moral hazard problem (Danzon 1983, Gravelle and Waterson 
1993, Emons and Garoupa 2006).
5. LEGAL EXPENSE INSURANCE
5.1 Introduction
The last instrument in combating the fi nancing problem discussed in this 
chapter is legal expense insurance. This instrument introduces an addi-
tional player into the analysis: the insurance company. Given that the 
interests of the insurer are not identical to those of the parties (plaintiff  
and defendant), and the interests of the lawyers involved are yet diff erent, 
the full picture becomes rather complicated. This holds even more if one 
realizes that each player may possess diff erent information. The multi-
tude of principal–agent relationships opens many possibilities of strategic 
 behaviour, which are dealt with in the following sections.
5.2 Level of Suit
Due to several reasons, legal expense insurances are expected to increase 
the level of suit. First, the insured plaintiff  does not bear the full litigation 
costs, which increases the claim’s expected value. Second, the insurance 
covers the plaintiff ’s risk, so that it induces risk- averse plaintiff s also to 
bring suit. Third, it solves a plaintiff ’s possible liquidity problem (Kirstein 
2000, Van Velthoven and Van Wijck 2001).
An additional, more problematic reason why the level of suit may 
increase is formed by the typical informational problems of insurance 
contracts: moral hazard and adverse selection. These problems, if not 
adequately addressed, may cause the market for legal expense insurance 
to fail (Bowles and Rickman 1998, p. 197). Due to adverse selection, 
mainly high- risks will take the insurance, increasing the likelihood that 
it will actually be used. Due to moral hazard, the insured may take fewer 
measures which could have avoided the confl ict in the fi rst place, again 
 increasing the  probability of using the insurance.
However, several instruments exist which allow insurance companies 
to confront both problems, such as risk diversifi cation, exclusion of 
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certain risks, deductibles et cetera. Empirical data from Germany and the 
Netherlands suggest that insurers are successful in this respect because, 
notwithstanding a rapid increase in the number of legal expense insur-
ances, the number of claims per 100 policies remained practically constant 
in the Netherlands in the period 2000–2008 (Verbond van Verzekeraars 
2005, pp. 26–27 and 2009, pp. 94–95) and only increased by 4–8 per cent in 
Germany (Kilian and Regan 2004, p. 242. The period is not mentioned).
5.3 Quality of the Claims
Legal expense insurance could theoretically cause a fl ood of unmeritorious 
litigation, now the plaintiff  does not bear the full costs of litigation. Claims 
could also be of low value, although the deductibles which are present in 
most policies reduce this problem.
However, the way in which insurances function in general reduces the 
scope for unmeritorious claims. In order for a risk to be insurable, the 
insurer needs a large enough volume of business, but he also needs to limit 
adverse selection (leaving moral hazard aside for the moment). The premi-
ums collected should be high enough to cover the costs, but they should not 
be too high to be attractive for the potential insured. The higher the pro-
portion of unmeritorious claims becomes, the higher the premiums have 
to be to cover the costs, inducing the good risks to terminate the insurance 
policy. Hence, in order to keep the insurance profi table, the insurer will pose 
limits on the coverage of unmeritorious claims. This can be done through, 
for example, only providing coverage if there is a reasonable chance of 
success (Rickman and Gray 1995, p. 311, Killian 2003, p. 46) and through 
the general obligation of good faith, which allows an insurer to deny cover-
age for groundless or unreasonable claims. Given that the insurer, being 
a repeat player, is better equipped to screen a case on its merits than the 
plaintiff  himself, who is likely to be a one- shotter, this screening will likely 
increase the overall quality of the claims being brought.
Empirical research suggests that there is only limited diff erence in the 
value of claims issued by insured and uninsured litigants. Furthermore, 
the percentage of insured litigants winning their case is only 3 per cent 
higher than that of uninsured (Prais 1995, p. 439). This could be caused by 
more careful screening of the insurer, but it is not clear whether this indeed 
is the case.
5.4 Drop Rate
Insured plaintiff s are less likely to drop their case, now they do not bear 
the full costs themselves (Bowles and Rickman 1998, p. 197). However, 
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the insurer can also infl uence the decision to drop a claim, by withdrawing 
coverage.
Two counteracting eff ects determine the overall impact of legal expense 
insurance on the drop rate. We do not have adequate data to determine 
the overall eff ect. The better screening of the insurer which we discussed 
in Section 5.3 results in fewer low- quality cases reaching the drop stage in 
the fi rst place, leading to a lower drop rate (selection eff ect). On the other 
hand, if the insurer acquires new information suggesting a lower value 
of the claim, he may decide to withdraw coverage. As we have argued in 
Section 4.4, hourly fee lawyers on the contrary have few incentives to cor-
rectly advise their clients in the drop phase. This suggests that the drop 
rate may be higher with legal expense insurance than without it (screening 
eff ect).
5.5 Settlement Rate
Looking at the parties involved in the dispute, legal expense insurance 
covers their litigation costs and hence reduces the settlement surplus as 
well as the likelihood of settlement (Kirstein 2000, Van Velthoven and Van 
Wijck 2001). Also, the positive impact of risk aversion on the willingness 
to settle is removed by the insurance. However, the insurer still can benefi t 
from settlement because it avoids the higher litigation costs. Hence, if 
allowed, the insurer may settle a case where the insured party would have 
preferred to go to trial.
If a plaintiff  has legal expense insurance, his bargaining position is 
better than without the insurance, because he can more credibly threaten 
to go to trial. This implies that if a settlement is reached, the amount 
settled for is expected to be higher (Heyes, Rickman and Tzavara 2004, 
p. 109).
Empirical research in Germany suggests that settlement is discouraged 
by legal expense insurance, because 5–8 per cent more litigants proceed to 
trial (Prais 1995, p. 439).
5.6 Level of Adjudication
The overall impact on the level of adjudication depends on the forego-
ing factors and cannot be predicted theoretically. According to Prais, a 
German study found that ‘legal expenses insurance enabled the insured to 
issue proceedings more readily and to pursue those proceedings to judg-
ment more tenaciously than if he did not have insurance’, but this increase 
was ‘only between 5 and 10 per cent’ (Prais 1995, p. 439).
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5.7 Duration of Claims
Under the assumption that the (professional) insurer is better able to 
evaluate the quality of a claim than the (often non- professional) plaintiff , 
and given the better incentives of the insurer as compared to hourly fee 
lawyers, we expect low- quality claims to be dropped sooner if the plaintiff  
uses a legal expense insurance.
Regarding settlements, the better incentives for the insurer as compared 
to hourly fee lawyers again predict quicker settlements. This is confi rmed 
empirically (Fenn et al. 2006, p. 26).
Regarding the duration of trial, two distinct principal–agent issues 
play a role. First, under an hourly fee system, an uninsured client has 
an incentive to monitor his attorney, given their diverging interests (see 
Section 4.9). If the client is insured, he no longer has this incentive. 
It is even in the immediate interest of the client if the lawyer spends 
more time on the case, if this improves the chances of success (Bowles 
and Rickman 1998, p. 200). The use of deductibles, co- payments and 
maximum coverage, as well as the possible increase in insurance pre-
miums caused by the increase in lawyers fees, may however reduce this 
problem. Second, the insurer has an interest in limiting the duration of 
trial, but he has only limited options in doing so. If the insurer provides 
counsel, he may have incentives available to avoid delay. If the client has 
free choice of counsel, this no longer holds (also see Chapter 5 by Van 
Boom in this book). The superior information of the insurer as opposed 
to the insured, however, may still enable the former to better control the 
behaviour of the lawyer.
5.8 Attorney Costs
Finally, also regarding attorney costs, insurers face principal–agent issues. 
In countries where attorney fees are regulated (such as the German 
BRAGO system), attorney costs are more predictable so that costs are 
more controllable. Employing in- house lawyers is another way to control 
and reduce costs (Kilian 2003, p. 42). The eff ect may be limited due to the 
right of the policyholder to choose its own counsel. Finally, insurers may 
invest in building a lasting relationship with a selected number of lawyers 
and law fi rms to handle their legal expense insurance cases. In such a rela-
tionship, costs are more controllable, due to the desire to maintain this 
relationship.
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In analyzing the impact of cost shifting, fee arrangements and legal 
expense insurance, economic literature addresses a multitude of eff ects. 
At the outset, improving private enforcement serves the goal of provid-
ing better behavioural incentives to the parties involved, so that they take 
better care, refrain from infringements, fulfi l their contractual obligations, 
et cetera. Given that these incentives are often provided in the form of 
damages to be paid to the plaintiff , the question of to what extent civil 
law actually leads to compensation for the plaintiff  obviously is relevant 
in this respect. The problem of rational apathy may frustrate private 
enforcement. Cost shifting, fee arrangements and legal expense insurance 
are possible solutions to this problem. In this Chapter, their impact on 
the diff erent levels of the dispute resolution process is analyzed from an 
economic viewpoint.
Cost shifting infl uences the level of suit in several ways. If a plaintiff  
assesses his chances of winning to be relatively high, he will sue more 
often under the English Rule than under the American Rule. The same 
holds if the plaintiff  expects to spend more on litigation than the defend-
ant. However, risk aversion poses a stronger restriction on the level of suit 
under the English Rule, as does the fact that trial expenditures increase 
under this rule. The overall eff ect is unclear. Contingency fees are expected 
to increase the level of suit; because it solves the fi nancing problem and it 
shifts the risk to a party who is better able to bear it. Legal expense insur-
ance also is expected to increase the level of suit, because the plaintiff  does 
not bear the costs, he is shielded from risk and his liquidity problem is 
solved. Furthermore, moral hazard and adverse selection, if not properly 
addressed, may increase the level of suit. Empirical research suggests that 
the increase is limited.
Cost shifting creates a selection eff ect towards higher- quality claims, 
because the lower the quality, the higher the probability of having to bear 
the other party’s litigation costs. Risk aversion strengthens this eff ect. 
Empirical research corroborates these theoretical fi ndings. Fee arrange-
ments are also expected to increase the quality of the claims, because the 
lawyer acts as a gate keeper. This argument is supported by empirical 
research. The fear for meritless litigation that is often expressed when 
discussing contingency fees therefore seems unwarranted. The same fear is 
expressed regarding legal expense insurances but, here as well, the insurer 
will limit such claims, for example through merit tests or the general obli-
gation of good faith. Hence, all three instruments have the potential to 
increase the quality of the claims.
All three instruments show two countervailing eff ects on the drop rate: 
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on the one hand, the higher quality of the claims may lead to a lower drop 
rate because the weaker claims have not even been fi led (selection eff ect). 
On the other hand, the cases that were fi led may be screened better so 
that an increase in the drop rate is possible (screening eff ect). Empirical 
research regarding cost shifting suggests that the latter eff ect dominates 
there, whereas the former eff ect seems to dominate in fee arrangements. 
We do not know of empirical research regarding the overall eff ect in case 
of legal expense insurance.
The eff ect of cost shifting on the settlement rate again is determined 
by several factors. The English Rule increases litigation expenditure and 
hence the settlement surplus, which makes settling more attractive. Risk 
aversion increases this tendency. However, overestimation of the prob-
ability of success causes a counter- eff ect. Empirical research suggests that 
the latter eff ect dominates, so that cost shifting decreases the settlement 
rate. Fee arrangements and legal expense insurance, according to the 
recent theoretical and empirical literature, show the same tendency.
Given all the previous eff ects, the impact of the instruments on the level 
of adjudication cannot be predicted theoretically. Empirical research indi-
cates that introduction of the English Rule leads to an overall decrease in 
adjudication, which is mostly caused by the higher drop rate. Contingency 
fees, on the other hand, tend to increase the level of adjudication. Legal 
expense insurance also leads to an increase, albeit a moderate one.
The total duration of the claim may be shortened by the English Rule, 
because it leads to an earlier drop and quicker settlements. However, 
adjudication may take longer because the trial expenditures tend to 
increase. Contingency fees also lead to a quicker drop, due to the superior 
information of the lawyer. Because a contingency fee lawyer does not 
gain from dilatory tactics, settlement and trial are expected to be fi nished 
quicker than under hourly fees. Legal expense insurance also leads to a 
quicker drop due to the better information of the insurer. Settlements will 
be quicker because the insurer does not gain by delay (diff erent from an 
hourly fee lawyer). The trial will probably also be shorter, but the insurer 
only has limited possibilities of infl uencing the duration.
Finally, fee arrangements and legal expense insurance have an impact 
on the relationship between the diff erent players (principals and agents). 
Contingency fees give the lawyer an own interest in winning the case, 
which better aligns his incentives with those of the client. However, he may 
advise contingency fees where an hourly fee would be more in the client’s 
interest, and he may negotiate a too- high percentage. Legal expense insur-
ance reduces the client’s incentives to avoid confl icts from arising in the 
fi rst place. If they arise, the client will start legal proceedings more readily 
and he has fewer incentives to monitor his lawyer. However, through 
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instruments such as deductibles, co- payments and maximum coverage, 
insurers combat these problems. In their relation with lawyers, insurers try 
to control and reduce costs by employing in- house lawyers, or to invest in 
building a lasting relationship with selected lawyers.
It seems that cost shifting, fee arrangements and legal expense insur-
ance are all able to lower the fi nancial hurdles in pursuing a legal claim. 
The English Rule, however, still leaves the fi nancial risk of losing the case 
with the plaintiff , and even increases the costs if the case indeed is lost. 
Contingency fees remove this risk altogether, and legal expense insur-
ance reduces it to the deductible, co- payment or amount exceeding the 
maximum cover. This reduction of fi nancial obstacles, combined with the 
selection eff ect towards higher quality claims, which all instruments show, 
has the potential to improve the behavioural incentives provided by the 
legal rules, because norm violators are better confronted with the conse-
quences of their behaviour. This, in the economic analysis of law, is not 
regarded as merely a desirable side- eff ect of civil litigation, but as its main 
goal. The desire to improve the accessibility of civil litigation is hence not 
only important in the legal view focussing on fairness, but equally so in the 
welfare- oriented economic view.
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